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Abstract
In this paper, we study the relationship between the provision of parental pocket and the level
of effort undertaken by the child at school. Under altruism, an increased amount of parental
transfer should reduce the child’s effort. Our empirical analysis is based on a French data set
including about 1,400 parent-child pairs. We find that children do not undertake less effort
when their parents are more generous.
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  During the last twenty years, several studies have evidenced the importance of private 
intergenerational transfers (Laferrère and Wolff, 2006). Parental assistance can take various 
forms across the life cycle. While previous studies have mainly focused on transfers received 
in the form of financial help, donations and bequests (i.e. transfers made after the children 
have  left  the  parental  home),  less  attention  has  been  devoted  to  support  received  during 
younger  ages,  in  particular  during  school  age.  This  is  probably  due  to  the  fact  that 
schoolchildren live with their parents and are unable to be financially independent, so that 
their own consumption cannot be distinguished from that of their parents. 
  Recently, a few papers have addressed the question of pocket money, showing that it 
is an important resource for young children especially at school ages (Furnham, 1999, 2001; 
Barnet-Verzat and Wolff, 2002, 2003; Dustmann and Micklewright, 2001; Dustmann et al., 
2004)
1. For instance, Barnet-Verzat and Wolff (2002) show that irregular allowances are more 
frequent than fixed amounts of money regularly given to the children and that parents who 
provide help to their children are better off financially. When children are young, irregular 
allowances are more frequent than regular ones, but their amounts are also lower compared to 
regular pocket money. As children grow up, pocket money becomes more common and both 
kinds of transfers are equally used.  
  These parental transfers have many implications. First, they may condition the future 
attitudes  of  children  towards  money.  Pocket  money  is  expected  to  hasten  autonomy  and 
recipients may develop sparing habits (Furnham, 1999). Second, these transfers may have 
disincentive effects for children. With more money, current consumption will increase and the 
child may do less effort at school. Also, a child may choose to work less in order to receive 
more  money,  as  shown  by  the  case  of  the  Rotten  Child  described  in  Bergstrom  (1989). 
Finally, parents do not have perfect information on the child’s needs. This asymmetry of 
information between generations will influence the pattern of transfers from parents and effort 
from the children (Chami, 1996, 1998). 
  From an empirical perspective, a few papers have studied the interaction between the 
labor force participation of schoolchildren and the amount of pocket money that they receive 
from their parents. Both in the US and in France, Kalenkoski and Pabilonia (2004) and Wolff 
(2006) find that parental transfers have no effect on the child’s labor supply. Conversely, in 
Britain, financial assistance significantly reduces the labor force participation of teenagers 
(through an income effect), while parents do not adjust their transfer payments to the child’s 
labor supply (Dustmann and Micklewright, 2001). These family decisions remain complex as 
they include allocation decisions between labor supply, other kinds of works like schoolwork 
and transfers to parents.  
  Understanding the relationship between parental transfer and child’s effort is mainly 
an empirical matter. While the provision of money is supposed to give the child incentives to 
work hard (as in the efficiency wage theory), she can as well take advantage of this money to 
work  less  and  devote  it  for  more  leisure  activities  to  the  detriment  of  schoolwork.  Also, 
parents  may  choose  to  observe  the  behavior  of  their  children’s  before  rewarding  them, 
depending on their results at school (Barnet-Verzat and Wolff, 2002). In this paper, we further 
investigate  the  potential  interaction  between  pocket  money  and  child’s  effort  using  data 
collected in 2003 on about 1,400 child-parents pairs in France. We estimate a simultaneous 
                                                 
1 In addition to these descriptive studies, there have been some attempts to explore the role of pocket money on 
social behavior. Abramovitch et al. (1991) and Fan (2000) show that the receipt of an allowance is likely to 
facilitate the development of monetary competence and, in turn, of cooperation.   1
equations model to further understand the complex relationship between parental transfers in 
the form of pocket money and child’s effort. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple 
model of transfers with endogenous effort and altruistic parental gift. We describe the data in 
Section 3 and present our estimation strategy in Section 4. Results on the relationship between 
the child’s effort and pocket money are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. A simple model of pocket money and child effort 
  We consider a setting in which the level of effort chosen by the child is presumably 
affected by the parental decision to transfer money. We rely on a simple theoretical model of 
transfers with two decision-makers, one parent and one child
2. 
  Let us begin with the child’s situation. We consider the case of a schoolchild living 
with her parent, without opportunity to undertake any paid activity during schooling. The 
child derives some satisfaction from private consumption. Her resources are given by the sum 
of a fixed income  H  (corresponding to housing costs and food consumption paid by parents) 
and  a  parental  transfer  T ,  with  the  non-negativity  constraint  0 ³ T .  The  child’s  time  is 
devoted to leisure activities and homework, with a preference for leisure. Let e be the child’s 
effort. We normalize to 1 the child’s full time, so that  e - 1  is the amount of leisure. The 
motive for undertaking effort at school is to increase future income when being adult. 
  The child’s utility function is defined over two periods, denoted by 1 and 2 as upscript. 
Let 
1 v  and 
2 v  be the corresponding functions. The child’s utility is expressed as: 
)) ( ( ) 1 , (
2 1 1 e w v e T H v v d + - + =           (1) 
where d  is equal to one plus the discount rate, and  (.) w  is the expected child’s wage which 
depends on the child’s current choice of effort. With more effort today, the child is expected 
to get higher future earnings. We have  0 ) ( 1 > e w  and  0 ) ( 11 < e w . Consumption and leisure 
activities are normal goods ( 0
1
1 > v ,  0
1
11 < v ,  0
1
2 > v ,  0
1
22 > v ). We assume that consumption 
and leisure are complementary goods, which implies  0
1
12 > v . Finally, we have  0
2
1 > v . The 
problem for the child is to choose the level of effort that maximizes her own utility function. 
The corresponding first-order condition is: 




2 = + - + - e w v e w e T H v d         (2) 
According to (2), the child’s optimal effort is such that its marginal cost 
1
2 v  is equal to its 
marginal benefit  d /
2
1 1v w . The child’s effort function thus depends on level of income  H , 
parental transfer T , discount rate d  and on the shape of the expected earnings profile. Let us 
investigate the effect of the transfer on the child’s effort. By differentiating the first-order 

















          (3) 
This derivative is negative given the complementarity between leisure and consumption. With 
more parental transfer, the child is expected to devote less time to homework, thereby leading 
                                                 
2 We neglect here potential strategic interactions between siblings.   2
to lower future opportunities. Note that this result does not hold when assuming separability 
between private consumption and leisure. With  0
1
21 = v , it follows that  0 / = dT de .  
  We now turn to the parental problem. We assume that the parent is altruistic and takes 
the well-being of the child into account (Becker, 1991). Although other transfers mechanisms 
are possible, the idea according to which parents care for their children when the latter are 
young seems not unrealistic a priori. Let  b  be the caring parameter ( 1 0 < < b ). The parent 
seeks to maximize his own utility function  ) (C u ,  C  being the private consumption with 
T Y C - = . The parental consumption is equal to the parent’s level of income Y  (labor supply 
is exogenous) minus the transfer made to the child. The parent thus seeks to maximize: 
      [ ] )) ( ( ) 1 , ( ) ( max
2 1 1
0 e w v e T H v T Y u T d b + - + + - ³       (4) 
The first-order condition is: 
0 ) 1 , ( ) (
1
1 1 = - + + - - e T H v T Y u b           (5) 
meaning  that  the  parent  seeks  to  equalize  the  marginal  disutility  1 u   involved  by  a  lower 
income with the weighted marginal gain of transferring resources 
1
1 v b . By differentiating (5), 
we obtain the optimal transfer rule  T  for the parent, which depends on the child’s effort 
decision.  So,  by  combining  the  first-order  conditions  (2)  and  (5),  we  deduce  the  optimal 
effort-transfer solution. Clearly, both variables of interest e and T  are interdependent
3. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
We use data from the Education and Family Survey conducted in France in 2003, 
which focuses on family investments in children’s education. It is based on a representative 
sample of households interviewed in October and November 2003, all the selected households 
having at least one child between 2 and 25 years old, living or not with parents, and attending 
school or university in October 2003 (see Gouyon, 2004).  
These data allow us to match information collected separately from children and from 
their parents. Parents were first interviewed about their own characteristics (like education 
attainment, resources, marital status, etc) and provided a description of their children. Then, 
separate  interviews  have  been  performed  with  children  when  the  latter  were  attending 
secondary schooling (786 observations) or postsecondary schooling (631 observations). Using 
the ‘child’ questionnaire, we obtain information on school attendance, money received from 
parents and attitudes towards school. When merging the characteristics of both generations, 
we obtain a sample of 1,380 parent-child pairs after deleting missing values. 
To study the relationships between pocket money and effort at school, we rely on the 
following information. On the one hand, the child indicates whether she has received any 
financial support from her parents: “Do you regularly receive any pocket money from your 
parents?”. The second endogenous variable, related to the child’s level of effort, is much more 
difficult to measure as it is subjective and may be assessed very differently from one person to 
another. For instance, using information on the effort outcome (say educational attainment) 
                                                 
3 The above framework is a Nash bargaining game. Another possibility would be to assume that there is only one 
dominant player, for instance the parent. In such a Stackelberg game, the underlying assumption is that the child 
perfectly observes the gift value, which is made by the parent. Then, the timing of the game would be as follows. 
First, the parent makes a commitment rule for financial transfers. Second, knowing the parental rule, the child is 
expected to choose a level of effort to maximize her own utility. Such a model is slightly different, since it leads 
to a recursive model instead of a fully simultaneous one.    3
may be problematic because of differences in ability. Some children can do very well with 
little effort, whereas others have to work very hard to only obtain good results. In order to 
measure child’s effort, we choose to use the following question: “what is your attitude toward 
marks? 1) you are not interested in marks, 2) you aim at getting half mark, 3) you try to get as 
good marks as possible”. We build a dummy variable which is equal to one when the child 
tries to get as good marks as possible. 
To explain these outcomes, we rely on the following explanatory variables. For the 
parent, sex of the respondent, age  and education are likely to influence attitudes towards 
education along with the provision of pocket money. The capacity to help the child is also 
expected to depend on living or not with a partner, being homeowner, and household income. 
Information remains scarce for the child. We select sex, age, number of siblings and rank 
within the sibship. We also account for characteristics on the local environment. On the one 
hand, the child indicates how she assesses the quality of school and teachers. On the other 
hand, we know whether the child may work quietly at home or whether she is disturbed 
during homework. 
  In France, more than one-half of the children receive regularly pocket money from 
their parents: 58% of pupils get regular allowances, the proportion being slightly higher for 
postsecondary pupils (65.5%) than for secondary ones (53.1%). The proportion of children 
receiving pocket money increases steadily as they grow up: 50% at the age of 11, 57% at 13, 
63%  at  15,  70%  at  16  (Figure  1).  These  figures  tend  to  lower  afterwards.  This  may  be 
explained by the fact that after 16, children have the possibility to earn their own money 
outside the family, parents consequently adjusting the level of transfers. Concerning effort, 
the data show that 28.8% of children make no effort to obtain good marks, whereas 71.2% do 
their best. We calculate the proportion of children making effort to achieve good marks as a 
function of the receipt of pocket money. As shown in Figure 2, we find no clear correlation 
between effort and parental transfer from a descriptive viewpoint. 
 
4. Econometric model 
  A  simultaneous  model  is  needed  to  fully  understand  the  interplay  between  child’s 
effort and pocket money. Specifically, we rely on a simultaneous equations framework with 
latent variables. Let us briefly describe the underlying methodology, the econometric model 
including two equations for each observation. 
  The first equation indicates the probability for a child to receive money. The pocket 
money  variable  is  explained  by  a  set  of  exogenous  variables  and  by  a  latent  variable 
corresponding to the child’s effort. Let 
* T  be the latent variable (either negative or positive) 
measuring the propensity to receive money work and 
* e  be the latent variable associated to 
child’s effort. The pocket money equation for the child can be expressed as: 
T T T T e X T e g b + + =
* *              (6) 
where  T X  is a set of variables explaining the probability to be helped,  T b  is the vector of 
associated parameters, and  T g  picks up the effect of effort on pocket money. The second 
equation indicates that the latent child’s propensity to undertake effort 
* e  depends on a set of 
exogenous covariates and on the latent variable associated to pocket money:  
e e e e T X e e g b + + =
* *             (7)   4
where e X  is the set of variables explaining the child’s level of effort,  e b  is the vector of 
associated parameters,  e g  measures the impact of parental transfer effort. 
  Note that we do not observe the latent variables 
* T  and 
* e , but we have information 
on their observed counterparts. Let  T  be a dummy variable related to the receipt of pocket 
money. We have  1 = T  when  0
* > T  and  0 = T  otherwise. In the same way, the child’s effort 
is equal to one when the child tries to achieve the best school results. We have  1 = e  when 
0
* > e  , and  0 = e  otherwise. This defines a simultaneous model with two Probit equations, 
one for pocket money and one for child’s effort. The model is logically consistent if the 
inequality  0 1 > - W Dg g  holds (Heckman, 1978, Maddala, 1983). To estimate the model, we 
rely on a maximum likelihood method
4.  
  Identification restrictions are needed to properly estimate the simultaneous equations 
model. Explanatory variables introduced in the pocket money equation include both child and 
parental characteristics. Among those covariates, family income and wealth (here a dummy 
for home ownership) are expected to enhance the propensity to give money to the  child. 
Conversely, the number of brothers and sisters should have a negative effect as parents have 
to  divide  their  resources  between  several  children.  A  priori,  both  parental  resources  and 
number of siblings should not affect the level of effort undertaken by the child. That the 
amount of parental income plays no role is a prediction of the theoretical model, it will have 
an indirect effect on effort only via the endogenous transfer variable. In the effort equation, 
we again introduce both child and parental variables as well as characteristics related to the 
quality of schooling and teaching. These variables are supposed to have no influence on the 
parental decision to give money to the child.  
 
5. Empirical results 
  We first estimate the probability for a child to receive money using a Probit model 
(Table 1). The main determinant of the transfer receipt is child’s age. The older she is, the 
higher  the  probability  of  receipt.  The  negative  sign  of  the  squared  term  shows  that  this 
probability reaches a maximum at about 16. We find no significant role for the child's gender 
and the number of siblings. While having several siblings tends to reduce the provision of 
money (as expected given scarce parental resources in that case), this effect is not significant 
at conventional level. The rank within the sibship has a positive influence, although it is 
hardly significant (at the 10 percent level)
5. 
Parental characteristics strongly matter. The main result is that more educated parents 
give more often money to their children, as do wealthier parents. In an altruistic model of 
transfers,  a  rich  parent  is  more  likely  to  help  the  child.  The  positive  effect  of  parental 
education may also be the sign that pocket money is part of family human capital investment. 
Other parental characteristics like age, gender or living conditions (having a partner, being 
homeowner) have no influence. As shown in Barnet-Verzat and Wolff (2002), the decision to 
give pocket money is mainly driven by the needs of the child and by the wish to make her 
more responsible with respect to money considerations. We also introduce in the regression 
our measure of the child’s effort. We find a negative effect when the child attempts to get 
good marks, but the relationship is hardly significant. 
                                                 
4 The log-likelihood of the model is given by a sum of terms involving the bivariate normal distribution function. 
5 This could be due to the fact that within a family, younger children tend to benefit from the experience of older 
brothers and sisters in extorting parental money.   5
   We also estimate a Probit equation to study the determinants of child’s effort. Young 
children are much more concerned by the desire to obtain good results at school. Boys and 
girls behave in the same way, and effort is an increasing function of the number of siblings. 
The parental level of education has a positive influence on the child’s effort. It may be that 
high educated parents spend more time with their children to inculcate how important are 
success and effort at school for future job opportunities. We also get positive coefficients 
when the respondent lives with a partner and is a woman, which may be due to the higher 
involvement of women in child care. 
The educational environment is of great importance when explaining effort. Children 
going to school considered as very good or good tend to work harder and do more effort. A 
similar  relationship  holds  with  the  self-rated  quality  of  the  class  teachers.  As  expected, 
interruptions during the child’s homework do exert a negative influence on school effort. 
Finally, we add in this equation an exogenous dummy variable related to the receipt of pocket 
money.  We  find  a  negative  relationship  between  pocket  money  and  effort,  but  again  the 
coefficient is not really significant at conventional level. 
  To  overcome  the  problem  of  endogeneity,  we  now  turn  to  the  estimation  of  the 
simultaneous Probit models (see Table 1). Results from the latent specification framework 
show that the provision of pocket money is absolutely not significant in the effort equation, 
while the level of effort undertaken by the child does not influence the generosity of the 
parent. It is rather difficult from the data to understand why parents decide to give pocket 
money to the child. As schoolchildren have no personal resources, parents may be tempted to 
choose  between  giving  money  to  their  children  or  directly  paying  for  all  their  personal 
expenditures. However, parents do not really take effort at school into account.  
 
6. Concluding comments 
  In this paper, we have investigated the relationship between the provision of pocket 
money  from  parents  and  the  level  of  effort  undertaken  by  the  child  at  school.  Using 
information collected in France on matched child-parent pairs France, our empirical analysis 
sheds  light  on  the  importance  of  pocket  money  for  schoolchildren.  We  estimate  the 
relationship  between  pocket  money  and  effort  using  a  simultaneous  model  of  two  Probit 
equations. Our main result is that there is no significant relationship between pocket money 
and  child’s  effort.  This  suggests  that  children  are  not  really  concerned  with  a  trade-off 
between consumption and effort when being young. While pocket money is only related to 
short term preoccupations, children certainly know that effort at school will have positive 
effects all over their life cycle in terms of permanent income.    6
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Table 1. Probit models and simultaneous equations model of pocket money and child effort 
Variables  Probit  Probit  Simultaneous Probit 
Pocket money  Child’s effort  Pocket money  Child’s effort 
  coef  t-test  coef  t-test  coef  t-test  coef  t-test 
Constant  -3.960
***  -3.15  5.977
***  4.57  -3.826
*  -2.40  5.452
***  2.83 
Child characteristics                 
Female  -0.042  -0.61  0.015  0.20  -0.042  -0.60  0.009  0.12 
Age  0.313
**  2.12  -0.747
***  -4.36  0.300  1.56  -0.697
***  -3.05 
Age squared (10
e-2)  -0.093
*  -1.86  0.221
***  3.86  -0.089  -1.44  0.206
***  2.83 
Number of siblings  -0.049  -1.40      -0.054  -1.53     
Rank  0.001
*  1.68  0.000  -0.76  0.001  1.29  -0.000  -0.35 
Parental characteristics                 
Female respondent  0.335  1.16  0.641
**  2.21  0.331  1.09  0.678
**  2.06 
Age  0.008  1.27  -0.005  -0.84  0.008  1.25  -0.004  -0.55 
Lives with partner  0.123  0.45  0.669
**  2.42  0.130  0.44  0.683
**  2.29 
Level of education                 
  No diploma  Ref        Ref    Ref   
  Secondary  0.137  1.36  0.046  0.45  0.141  1.38  0.071  0.56 
  Baccalaureate  0.260
*  1.92  0.156  1.11  0.269
*  1.93  0.202  1.00 
  Graduate studies  0.332
**  2.19  0.295
*  1.82  0.344
**  2.14  0.355  1.44 
  Postgraduate studies  0.357
***  2.58  0.341
**  2.44  0.373
**  2.47  0.407
*  1.66 
Parental income (log)  0.113
**  2.07      0.104
**  2.05     
Home ownership  -0.020  -0.26      -0.037  -0.48     
Scholarship environment                 
School considered to be very good      0.564
***  3.84      0.560
***  3.77 
School considered to be rather good      0.291
***  3.62      0.285
***  3.50 
Teachers considered to be the best      0.426
**  2.47      0.435
**  2.49 
Child interrupted during homework      -0.142
*  -1.73      -0.143
*  -1.74 
Parental transfer and effort                 
Pocket money – exogenous      -0.118  -1.54         
Child’s effort – exogenous  -0.118  -1.50             
Pocket money – endogenous              -0.189  -0.42 
Child’s effort – endogenous          -0.049  -0.31     
Coefficient of correlation (t-test)      -0.073 (-1.53) 
Number of observations  1380  1380  1380 
Log likelihood  -911.9  -772.3  -1685.2 
Survey INSEE-INED Education 2003. 
Note: The dependent variables are respectively the receipt of pocket money from parents and the fact that the child tries to get the 
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